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The Rhetorical Constitution of "Civil
Society" at the Founding: One Lawyer's
Anxious Visiont
STEPHEN A. CONRAD*
The Author of our existence intended us to be social beings; and has,
for that end, given us social intellectual powers. They are original
parts of our constitution; and their exertions are no less natural than
the exertions of those powers which are solitary and selfish.
-James Wilson, in his Lectures on Law'
INTRODUCTION
The founder James Wilson (1742-1798) in his day was widely regarded as one
of the most influential framers and theorists of American constitutionalism. 2 He
was also widely regarded by some of his most discriminating contemporaries as
the best lawyer and legal theorist in the early Republic Moreover, so Adam
Seligman has argued, the eighteenth century in America proved the very
"paradigm or model," the fullest embodiment4 of what Marvin Becker has
t Some portions of this essay (on "female citizenship") were first presented at faculty
workshops in 1986 and 1995 at Florida State University and Bowling Green State University,
respectively. Some other portions have grown out of a 1995 colloquium sponsored by Liberty
Fund, Inc. I thank all the many participants, too numerous to name, in those workshops and
that colloquium for their comments and suggestions. I also thank Jack Greene for his
"Comment" at the March 29, 1996 Law and Society Symposium at Indiana
University-Bloomington. And I thank Jan Lewis and Linda Kerber for guidance in revising
this essay after its Symposium presentation. Above all, I gratefully acknowledge the importance
to my work (beyond even what my text and footnotes extensively indicate) of a recent article
by Jan Lewis that she brought to my attention just as I began revising: Jan Lewis, "Of Every
Age Sex & Condition": The Representation of Women in the Constitution, 15 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 359 (1995).
* Professor of Law and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington; Ph.D., 1980, Harvard University; J.D., 1982, Yale University.
1. JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 230 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967)
[hereinafter WORKS]; ef id. at 236, 238, 239, 241 (on the naturalness of human "sociability"
and "society").
2. E.g., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197-
98 (1913).
3. See the numerous testimonials I have collected for citation in Stephen A. Conrad,
Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union, 13 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 1, 9 n.8 (1988).
4. ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 12, 61 (1992) [hereinafter SELIGMAN,
CIVIL SOCIETY]. Compare his complementary study, focusing on seventeenth-century America,
found in ADAM B. SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY INDIVIDUALISM: CHARISMATIC COMMUNITY AND
ITS INSTITUTIONALIZATION at ix (1994) [hereinafter SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY
INDIVIDUALISM] ("[W]hat I have attempted in this study is precisely to analyze the emergence
of modem ideas of individual and collective identity in and through the concrete process of
institutionalization that characterized ascetic-Protestantism in one seventeenth-century
community-that of New England Congregational Puritanism.").
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somewhat more generally called a "privileged moment'" in the history of the
Western idea of "civil society." If only (but not only) on these grounds, I would
justify my sustained focus here on a narrowly specific but historically important
and otherwise illustrative topic: how this lawyer and framer James Wilson
elaborated and used the idea of "civil society" to various purposes and effects in
late eighteenth-century America. My aim is largely and generally to convey
something of the complexity, ambiguity, and evident anxiety of Wilson's vision,
or visions, of civil society. To that end, I want to examine in particular the
problematic relationships between and among Wilson's ideas about "civil
society" on the one hand and, on the other hand, some of his ideas about law,
government, individual and social identity, male and female citizenship,
and-arching over everything else-his rhetorical approach to the authority of
nature. Indeed, Wilson's arguments from "nature" and the problematics of his
naturalistic rhetoric ultimately become my chief concern in this essay.
One of the broader implications of what I say about Wilson is, however, that
it lends support to the view of many scholars that the American Revolution
(1776-1783) and the subsequent national Founding (1787-1791) were,
conceptually at least, much of a piece.6 And, to broaden this point about
conceptual continuity amid conceptual change even further, careful attention to
how Wilson used the idea of "civil society"--as early as 1768 and well into the
1790s-poses a notable exception to Gordon Wood's recent generalization that
the Revolution brought a radical conceptual change, in that "most people in [the]
very different distant world [of pre-Revolutionary America] could not as yet
conceive of society apart from government."7 Moreover, I note with special
5. See generally MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A PRIVILEGED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND
FRANCE (1994).
6. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985);
Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23
(Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of
American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its
aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-
81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond,
with that of Richard Matthews in 1995-as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We
the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
121, 170-72 (1996).
7. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1992)
[hereinafter RADICALISM]. I do not mean to challenge Wood's central claim that the American
Revolution in many ways "fundamentally altered the character of American society." Id. "To
be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and
behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution:
it was the Revolution, and only the Revolution, that made them one people." Id. at 336. For a
contrasting remark, see WOOD, supra note 6, at 606 ("Americans had begun the Revolution
assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the rulers. But such
an assumption belied American experience, and it took only a few years of independence to
convince the best minds that distinctions in the society were 'various and unavoidable'....").
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interest that in Professor Jack P. Greene's comment directly following this essay
narrowly focused on Wilson, Greene makes a compelling general argument that
both the ideas and realities of American "civil society" at the late eighteenth-
century "Founding" evinced important continuities with the sum of the colonial
British American experience overall.8
In any case, as to Wilson himself, not only did he, well before Americans
contemplated Independence and Revolution, conceive of society categorically
quite apart from government. But, pace, Professor Wood, Wilson had an
elaborately theoretical, albeit hardly unique,9 concept of society in general and
American society in particular. Visionary that he was, Wilson is said to have
"postulated an American society before one existed, and his constitutional theory
in large measure reflected that assumption."'" The arguable shortcomings of
Wilson's postulation as empirically valid sociology are, however, not my concern
here." I am concerned, rather, with how and why, throughout the changing
contexts of the pre-Revolutionary, Revolutionary, and Founding periods, he set
forth so much of his civic vision in terms of his social theory. Even more to the
point, I want to explore how and why it was that a distinctive concept of "civil
society" in America seems to have motivated, justified, and shaped his
contributions as a "thinking"' 2 American revolutionary and founder.
Furthermore, an important theme in the interpretation I offer here is that, despite
the distinctive concept of "civil society" that Wilson invoked by and large
throughout his public career, there was change within continuity: his particular
conceptions of "civil society" varied appreciably to suit the immediate needs to
which he was responding consciously or unconsciously, expressly or implicitly.
Not presuming to give here a thorough account of all Wilson's thoughts on
"civil society," I want to avail myself of a heuristic organizational device, by
taking a single text from his pen as a point of departure and frequent reference.
To be fair, Wood defines the Revolution broadly: "[Tlhe American Revolution and the social
transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were
inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened 'in any
case,' but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together."
RADICALISM, supra, at 7. My complementary not contradictory emphasis is, more than Wood's,
on social theory rather than social reality.
8. See Jack P. Greene, Civil Society and the American Foundings, 72 IND. L.J. 375, 381
(1997); cf id at 376-77.
9. Cf id at 380 (quoting Samuel Williams to the effect that political writers like Thomas
Paine and Wilson merely placed in "a very clear and striking lighf' principles that were
commonplaces of the day in colonial British America).
10. George M. Dennison, The "Revolution Principle": Ideology and Constitutionalism in
the Thought of James Wilson, 39 REV. POL. 157, 190 (1977).
11. For a review of some of the most compelling "hard" data indicative of "the emerging
society of late colonial British America," see JACK P. GREENE, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS: THE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN BRITISH COLONIES AND THE FORMATION OF
AMERICAN CULTURE 170-71, 193,passim (1988).
12. RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 1-16 (1987). For a discussion of "the need to come to terms" with the better minds
among the founders "in the act of thinking clearly, forcefully, and deliberately," see id. at 16.
On Wilson specifically, see id. at 100 n.15, 103, 106-07, 111, 115, 132.
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This text is what has come down to us as his law lecture entitled Of Man, as a
Member of Society.3 It is thus a text from near the end of his public career, when
he was in a position to engage in relatively "comprehensive"' 4 reflection. It is a
lecture from the series of Lectures on Law, 1790-1791, that he intended to
bequeath as his summa civica, on American society, law, government, and
constitutionalism. 5 But it is a lecture, like all the others in the series, that he
ultimately left unrevised. It fell to his son Bird Wilson to edit and publish the law
lectures after the elder Wilson's death, and also to divide the run-on manuscript
into discrete lectures and give each a title that Bird, not his father, formulated.
But notwithstanding the possible inauthenticity, strictly speaking, of the contours
and the title of this lecture Of Man, as a Member of Society, the text is manifestly
authentic in sounding or alluding to so much of what Wilson had to say about
"civil society" over the course of his public career.
I. "CIVIL SOCIETY" AS NECESSITY AND NORM IN WILSON'S
CONCEPTIONS OF "POLITE" SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
Even within the confines of the short text of the law lecture in question (twenty
pages in the modern edition), there is ambiguity, perhaps even internal
contradiction, in the ways Wilson uses the term "civil society." This problematic
will strike both students of the idea of "civil society" in general, and students of
Wilson in particular, as quite unsurprising. Among the former group, there are
many who view the very idea of "civil society" by (whatever) definition as
always having been and still today fraught with internal tensions or
contradictions.' 6 And among students of James Wilson there is a longstanding
interest in his concern over apparent contradictions, and in his aim to
"synthesize" ideas in order ultimately to "reconcile" what might seem
contradictory. 7 In this respect Wilson stands squarely apart from that most
prototypically modern social scientist among the founders, Alexander
Hamilton," who wrote in The Federalist No. 23: "Let us not attempt to reconcile
contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative."' 9 Instead, Wilson took
his stand with David Hume of the Essays, Moral and Political, where Hume had
13. WORKS, supra note I, at 227.
14. On Wilson's anti-reductive aspirations to be comprehensive, see, for example, id. at
200.
15. The best general sustained accounts of the lectures are GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON
150-59 (1978); CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 308-41
(1956); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to WORKS, supra note 1, at 37-40.
16. A convenient exposition and commentary on the ideas of a number of representative
leading twentieth-century critics of the idea of "civil society" is provided in JEAN L. COHEN &
ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 177-341 (1992) (Section II: The
Discontents of Civil Society).
17. See McCloskey, supra note 15, at 24; cf Jan Lewis, "Of Every Age Sex & Condition":
The Representation of Women in the Constitution, 15 J. EARLYREPUBLIC 359, 375 n.49 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Judith N. Shklar, Alexander Hamilton and the Language of Political Science,
in THE LANGUAGES OF POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 339 (Anthony Pagden
ed., 1987).
19. THE FEDERALISTNO. 23, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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written: "'The Heart of Man is made to reconcile Contradictions."' 20 Indeed, in
striking contrast to Hamilton, Wilson, in one of his other law lectures (which,
taken all together, constitute, one modem editor surmises, "[Wilson's] pretension
to challenge the renown of the Federalist Papers, but extending to a far wider
terrain"2"), avows an aim, an overall orientation, at odds with the posture of
disinterested rationalism sustained by Publius.' Wilson confesses, in his lecture
entitled Of Municipal [what we might now call "man-made"] Law, "I search not
for contradictions: I wish to reconcile what is seemingly contradictory."23 This
difference in orientation between Publius and Wilson-between Publius's
"science of politicks" and Wilson's aspirational and affective civics-is
pervasive with Wilson. And the difference is merely but well illustrated by those
several instances in which Publius (Hamilton or Madison) spoke of "civil
society."
For as David Epstein aptly conveys in his study The Political Theory of The
Federalist, Publius tends to speak of "civil society" in a way that reflects not only
the positive capability but also the comparatively modest limitations of the
Lockean idea of "civil society."24 Society itself, whether in the condition of
natural or civil society, rightfully can and should protect its members from
tyrannical government, through concerted social acts of justified rebellion or
revolution. But "civil society," like "civil government," is for Publius, as for
Locke, merely a rationalistic instrumental entity,' 5 with "justice" as the end to be
served. And Publius's rather minimalist idea of "justice" as an ultimate end is
similarly Lockean in that justice is conceived to inhere merely in the protection
of each individual's faculties. Indeed, it is to secure precisely this end that
individuals, out of fear and prudence, join together to form a civil society in the
20. James Farr, Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 13, 29 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988). This is not
the utilitarian empiricist, provocatively skeptical Hume of the Treatise, but Hume the practical
"common sense" social and moral theorist notably interpreted in DAVID F. NORTON, DAVID
HUME: COMMON-SENSE MORALIST, SCEPTICAL METAPHYSICIAN (1982), and DONALD W.
LIVINGSTON, HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON LIFE (1984).
21. Robert G. McCloskey, James Wilson, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 79, 90 (Leon Friedman &
Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); cf Lewis, supra note 17, at 370 ("In their subject matter, the
Lectures invite comparison with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and as such, they
are a key text in the history of liberal thought in America.... Furthermore, because the lectures
attempted to discuss systematically the relationship between society and government, they
illuminate connections that others left unstated.").
22. For analysis of The Federalist that posits an interplay th&re between "Lockean
rationalism" and "Humean empiricism," see MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 13-22 (1987).
23. WORKS, supra note 1, at 185.
24. See generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984).
25. For another reading of The Federalist that also stresses "the supremacy of reason," for
Publius, but within a framework of intellectual history more closely identified with the
eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment than with Locke, see Daniel W. Howe, The
Language ofFaculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 107, 119 (discussing "the rationalistic and elitist appeal of
The Federalist"); see id. at 129 (emphasizing the "supremacy of reason"); cf id. at 122.
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first place; and it is to further secure this same end of security and self-protection
that individuals in civil society proceed to institute civil government, which is by
definition a regime of those laws necessary for sustaining over time just
relations-security and protection of rights-among the citizenry.26
As Epstein acknowledges, albeit insufficiently in my view, James Wilson had
a very different idea from Publius's of the capability of civil society and civil
government.27 Wilson's was a more expansive idea, which virtually posited "civil
society"-although not civil government-as an end in itself. In no way
derogating from the importance of a civil regime ofjustice secured through laws,
Wilson posited an end beyond and above even justice. This end was, he insisted,
nothing less than human happiness. This felicity precept was a recurring motif
in Wilson's thought from the 1760s onwards." "Happiness is the centre, to which
men and nations are attracted," as he put it at one point in his law lectures. 29 The
motif is characteristically prominent in his lecture Of Man, as a Member of
Society. There he sets forth yet again his felicity precept, and with a
quintessentially naturalistic emphasis unsurpassed elsewhere:
Nature has implanted in man the desire of his own happiness; she has inspired
him with many tender affections towards others, especially in the near
relations of life; she has endowed him with intellectual and with active
powers; she has furnished him with a natural impulse to exercise his powers
for his own happiness, and the happiness of those for whom he entertains
such tender affections.30
This passage is laden with themes to which I shall return, including the
"dictating" authority of nature, and both the "intellectual" and "active" character
of the human impulse to sociability-not to mention the repeated allusion here
to the special individual happiness realized "especially" in the sphere of domestic
family life. But for the moment, I mean to call attention above all to the
fundamentality of Wilson's felicity precept in his social thought, and indeed, to
his virtual identification of "happiness" with "society." In fact, he goes so far as
26. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 48, 58, 78-79, 92, 144, 163; see also Greene, supra note 8,
at 380 (quoting Adam Smith's characterization of "the whole system of American
Republicanism"); cf id. at 378 ("[T]hey quickly established laws and governments, the
principal purposes of which were little more than to protect their settlements against Indians
or rival Europeans and to secure the property they were creating and accumulating .....
27. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 210 n.60.
28. See, e.g., The Visitant [No. 1], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White) ("Our happiness, which is the final end of our existence, and the mark at which we aim,
though sometimes injudiciously, in all our conduct, cannot be obtained without being
acquainted with those sentiments and affections, which are to enjoy that happiness."); Greene,
supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Wilso from a 1774 pamphlet, in which Wilson invokes the
authority of Burlamaqui for the proposition that "the happiness of the society" is "thefirst law
of every government") (emphasis in original); cf MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 132, 134-36, 227-28, 268 (1978) (discussing Burlamaqui's influence
on Wilson).
29. WORKS, supra note 1, at 159.
30. Id. at 241-42 (punctuation modernized for clarity). But see infra notes 205-14 and
accompanying text for Wilson's vision of an expanded happiness realized beyond affective
family life.
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to assert: "Take away society, and you destroy the basis on which the
preservation and happiness of human life are laid."'" And-here is a point likely
as strange to us today as it was crucial to Wilson's pre-modern, quite un-modem,
social and civic theory-to Wilson, as between mere "preservation" and
"happiness," the latter takes on the "greater importance," at least as a matter of
express emphasis.2 Wilson is sensible to the at once prudent and reassuring
proposition so familiar as one of the litanies of the Scottish Enlightenment, that
"[s]ociety is necessary as well as natural to us."33 Both "our security" and "our
enjoyments" depend equally upon living in conditions of society?4 But Wilson's
emphasis on human happiness and enjoyments over and above their logical
prerequisites-preservation and security of life itself, and of property 3s -is,
however illogical and imprudent it might appear, nonetheless necessarily entailed
in his concept of "civil society."
For to Wilson "civil society" denominates much more than what it is in
Lockean histoire raisonni, that is, a potential agency of libertarian
revolution-yet beyond that, then largely but a predicate of just civil government.
And, even more important for my instant purposes, Wilson was much less
inclined than was Publius to elide the distinction between civil society and civil
government-even in the unique case of the United States of America, where
"the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the
representatives of the people."36 To Wilson the concept of "civil society" was in
and of itself not just an analytical category of historical sociology, jurisprudence,
31. WORKS, supra note 1, at 236 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity).
32. Id. at 236-38.
33. Id. at 234. The classic treatment of this central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment
remains GLADYS BRYSON, MAN AND SOCIETY: THE SCOTTISH INQUIRY OF THE EiGHTEENTH
CENTURY 148-72 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., Princeton University Press 1968) (1945); cf
Rildiger Schreyer, "Pray What Language Did Your Wild Couple SpeakA When First They
Met? "--Language and the Science ofMan in the Scottish Enlightenment, in THE "SCIENCE OF
MAN" IN THE SCOTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: HUME, REID AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES 149, 159
(Peter Jones ed., 1989).
34. WORKS, supra note 1, at 235-36.
35. No single remark by Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention or afterwards is as often
quoted by modem scholars as is his astonishing insistence that, orthodox republican theory
notwithstanding, "he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of
Govemt. & Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble
object." I THERECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937). For a list of some modem scholars' quotation of this passage, see Conrad, supra
note 3, at 35 nn. 140-41. Compare more recently JENNIFER NEDELsKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS
LEGACY 96-97 (1990) and Lewis, supra note 17, at 367.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 19, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton). But see THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 19, at 583 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I shall only observe, that
as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law,
that 'States neither lose any of their rights, nor are dischargedfrom any of their obligations
by a change in the form of their civil government."') (emphasis in original) (quoting the
eighteenth-century English jurisprude Thomas Rutherforth). For Wilson, see WORKS, supra
note 1, at 238.
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or "the new science of politicks"; civil society was also a transcendentally"7
moral category. In the distinction Wilson made between "natural society" and
"civil society" there was little of the Lockean 38 -much less the Hobbist 39 -idea
of civil society as but a recourse, undertaken out of self-interest, prudence, or
fear. Indeed, said Wilson, "nature" and "nature's God appointed man" such that
in pursuing human happiness "self-love and social are the same., 40
In Wilson's view, then, "civil society" was more natural to man than was
"natural society," in that "civil society" realized human nature in its "improved"'
condition, which was the condition for which mankind had always been and
would ever remain destined, by "that divinity which governs the whole
universe."42 In such a view "civil society" became a natural and ordained
phenomenon with the authority of a fundamental norm that Wilson could and did
invoke with such virtuosity in so many discursive contexts that it raises
interesting questions about those contexts, even when what Wilson had to.say
might strike a reader today (who is likely to be less sanguine about human nature
and less assured of benign Providence) as unpersuasive at best.
What I have called Wilson's ultimate felicity precept-his positing human
happiness as the natural and justifiable end of all human endeavor-and his
virtual identification of society, above all "civil society," with human happiness
were notions hardly peculiar to Wilson in his day. Indeed, among historians
today, no one more than Jack Greene has elucidated Americans' "pursuits of
happiness"43 as a generalized aspect of colonial and early American
"identities." 44 In a recent review of an important book on the material consumer
culture of colonial America, Greene refers pointedly to "the related culture of
politeness" and its "centrality ... to the fulfillment of individual [American]
colonists' quests for domestic happiness. 45
Greene's familiar reference to the relationship between the "culture of
politeness" and individuals' quests for happiness, particularly (but not only)
domestic happiness, could hardly have been better exemplified in late colonial
British America than in Wilson's debut as a published author, in a series of
37. I use this word in the sense found in SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 64, 99.
38. For a different, indeed significantly although but partially Lockean, reading of Wilson
in this very respect, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 372-74. In differing with Lewis's Lockean
reading, I do so for reasons indicated in my text and well-summarized in the following recent
study, which I consider thus far unmatched on its topic in the depth of its research and cogency
of its argument: KNuD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAw AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GRoTIus
TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 326 (1996).
39. WORKS, supra note 1, at 228-29.
40. Id. at 238.
41. Id. at 139; cf id. at 87, 164-65, 200.
42. Id. at 239 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
43. See generally GREENE, supra note 11.
44. JACK P. GREENE, IMPERATIVES, BEHAVIORS, AND IDENTITIES: ESSAYS IN EARLY
AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY 143-73, 290-317 (1992).
45. Jack P. Greene, Book Review, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 185 (1996); cf John Brewer,
"The Most Polite Age and the Most Vicious. " Attitudes Towards Culture as a Commodity,
1660-1800, in THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE, 1600-1800: IMAGE, OBJECT, TEXT 341 (Ann
Bermingham & John Brewer eds., 1995).
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"Addisonian" 46 essays written by Wilson, together with his friend William
White,47 and printed in the Pennsylvania Chronicle in 1768. This was only three
years after Wilson's emigration from Scotland, at age twenty-three. Eager for
diversion from their respective studies in law and divinity, Wilson and White
published their series of sixteen essays under the archly presumptuous joint pen
name "the Visitant," They wrote from what at least one contemporary reader took
to be the point of view of"a very polite sort of a gentleman,"48 for "politeness"
remained a prominent topic throughout the essays. And it was not least in
developing the complex meanings of politeness that the Visitant, in 1768,
anticipated much of what Wilson, then the struggling young lawyer, would later
say as the first Professor of Law at the College of Philadelphia, in his lecture Of
Man, as a Member of Society. In fact, in the Visitant's very first essay
jurisprudence itself was defined with an expressly sociological emphasis: "The
study of the different sciences is only the study of man in different views. Logic
considers us as men of sense; ethics, as men of virtue; criticism, as men of taste;
jurisprudence, as members of society. 49
Nevertheless the Visitant, writing in 1768 as "a very polite sort of a
gentleman," therefore by definition did not write from the point of view of a
lawyer, jurisprude, or any other particular "character." To the Visitant,
participation in "polite" society-which, as we shall see, had for Wilson a
meaning synonymous with what he at times meant by "civil society"--enjoined
upon every member of society a "complaisance" 0 that required suppressing any
professional or other distinguishing, hence dissociating, elements of an
individual's particular personality in the individual's presentation of his or her
social persona. In the words of a key "maxim" in the second of the sixteen
essays:
[E]very one should do what lays [sic] in his power to please his company.
Agreeable to this rule, I would have nothing advanced but what may appear
to be of general importance, because nothing else can afford general pleasure.
No regard should be paid to the particular circumstances of any one; the
Lawyer, the Merchant, and the Politician, should each lay aside what
distinguishes him from the rest, and appear in no other character than as a
man of sense.5'
46. SMITH, supra note 15, at 35.
47. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15,
at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE,
D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
48. The Visitant [No. 11], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 4-11, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White).
49. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28 (emphasis added).
50. Id
51. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White)
(punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE:
JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being
sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing
process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5,
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Although in Wilson's classification of the sciences that study human nature it
.was "logic" that studies "us as men of sense," what Wilson meant by the terms
logic and sense differs greatly from what is typically meant by those terms today.
The terms sense and plain sense and good sense-terms the Visitant used
interchangeably" 2 -denominated for him not some morally neutral faculty of the
mind emblematic of the discipline of "logic" today. Rather, to the Visitant,
"sense" was a "polite" social virtue, indeed, the most important of the social
virtues, because it was the most polite, and was therefore the human faculty that
best realized and justified "civil society" as an active exercise of moral/civic
significance.
For the Visitant "civil society" was in nothing better epitomized than in polite
conversation, that is, conversation that is at once "pleasant" and "useful,""
conversation that evinces "the natural and graceful expression of the social
virtues,"4 above all the cardinal social virtue of "sense."5 5 And it was in
discussing such conversation that the Visitant ultimately gave his clearest
explanation of what he meant by "sense."
This explanation came in an essay in which he contrasted the precarious
sequence of mental acts involved in reasoning with the simpler, more immediate,
and more trustworthy operations of "sense.""6 He also made clear that he was
using this pregnant term sense to denote not only the operations of the physical
senses but also, by analogy, something more. He insisted that "sensible
conversation" offers its unique opportunities for moral improvement primarily
because "the most important moral truths are discovered not by reasoning, but
by that act of the mind" fittingly known as "perception" by the "moral sense. 's
Given the Visitant's view of the moral sense as trustworthy, and as commonly
endowed among mankind as are the physical senses, then the Visitant evidently
fell in with the distinctive tradition of eighteenth-century Scottish moralists from
Hutcheson to Hume and Smith that the truths of morality and virtue are-or can
at 56, on the "regulation" of the "matter and manner of conversation": "The periodical essay
in Samuel Johnson's view presented general knowledge appropriate for circulation in common
talk... introducing 'subjects to which faction had produced no diversity of sentiment such as
literature, morality and familiar life."' Id.
52. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28; The Visitant [No. 3], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 8-15,
1768 (James Wilson & William White).
53. The Visitant [No. 14], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 25-May 2, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White).
54. The Visitant [No. 4], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 15-22, 1768 (James Wilson & William White)
(emphasis in original).
55. Cf BECKER, supra note 5, at 57 ("The 'severe virtues' were rivaled by those virtues
measured by the yardstick of culture and taste. Instead of more demanding criteria for
measuring truth, the English vocabulary favored the looser usage derived from 'common sense'
and 'good sense,' both of which became hardy staples in literary and philosophical
discourse.").
56. The Visitant [No. 13], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 18-25, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White). 1
57. Id. (emphasis in original); cf WORKS, supra note I, at 133.
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and should be-matters of consensus."8 In fact, by the time Wilson came more
fully under the sway of the prevalent "moral Newtonianism" of the day, and the
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid's moral Newtonianism in particular,59 he had
moved from a vision of consensus to one of unanimity. In his law lectures, only
several paragraphs before he moved to the topic that he or his filial editor
formulated as Of Man, as a Member of Society, Wilson, following Reid, averred:
All first principles must be the immediate dictates of our natural faculties; nor
is it possible that we should have any other evidence of their truth. In
different sciences the faculties which dictate these first principles are very
different: the eye in astronomy and opticks; the ear, in musick; the moral
sense in morals.60
And then after a Reidian encomium to the epochal progress that Bacon and
Newton had achieved in establishing the incontestable validity of certain first
principles in mathematics and physics, Wilson, specifically citing Reid, held out
this vision: "If the same unanimity concerning first principles could be
introduced into the other sciences as in those of mathematicks and natural
philosophy, this might be considered as a new era in the progress of human
reason." 6 ' As Wilson had said earlier, "[o]ur progress in virtue should certainly
bear a just proportion to our progress in knowledge. Morals are undoubtedly
capable of being carried to a much higher degree of excellence than the [natural]
sciences, excellent as they are."'62
Thus the science that most concerned Wilson was "moral science," built on the
"axioms" perceived by the moral sense. This moral sense the Visitant assumed,
58. The Visitant, [No. 13], supra note 56; cf BECKER, supra note 5, at 56; FLIEGELMAN,
supra note 51, at 74 (stating the belief that Jefferson and Wilson and others shared in "a natural
rhetoric of consensus").
59. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its
refinement. See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS
AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH,
Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A
HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World
Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred
M. Bork eds., 1964).
Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian
Turn ofBritish Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103
(Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's
Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID:
Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull
and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE
AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN,
ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995).
By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as
an Individual-that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised
Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf id. at
193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
60. WORKS, supra note 1, at 225 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
61. Id. at 226 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
62. Id. at 147 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
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in line with the prevailing view of most eighteenth-century British moral sense
theorists, to be a common, if not quite universal, attribute of mankind.63 Indeed,
as I have indicated above, the idea of commonality lay at the heart of what
"sense" generally signified to the Visitant. Nevertheless, in one of his most
arresting remarks, prominently placed at the end of his first essay and echoed
throughout the series, the Visitant professed: "One particular more in my
disposition I must mention, because it is a particular on which I greatly value
myself-I prefer the conversation of a fine woman to that of a philosopher."'
The Visitant was quick to explain:
The reflections of the philosopher are deduced in a chain of abstract
reasoning, from principles which he has acquired either by reading or
observation; hence the connexion between his principles and his conclusions
(upon which the truth of the latter depends) is generally slight and
uncertain-and frequently erroneous. But the sentiments of a sensible
woman, arise in an easy and natural way from matters of common
observation, without the intervention of many intermediate ideas-hence
your fair companion will entertain you with more plain, agreeable and just
[that is, empirically valid] reflections than [will] the profound philosopher.65
Here we have the earliest intimations from James Wilson's pen of what he was
to develop into a distinctive variation on the theme of "the gendered meanings
of virtue in Revolutionary America," to quote the title of a now classic article by
Ruth Bloch.66 And what was most distinctive about Wilson's variation on the
theme was not only his polite view that "civil society"-as a theater of "common
observation" shared through "polite conversation"-in its sociological, moral,
and felicitous significances was most perfectly realized "in small companies...
best when they are composed of near an equal of both sexes," under the
predominating influence of "Ladies" of "sense."67 Going further, Wilson
eventually came to expound a view of female citizenship in the American
Republic that put such a premium on "sensible" female eloquence per se that
such eloquence seemed virtually indispensable for securing the felicity of
individuals and society in the Republic, and perhaps indispensable for the
preservation of the Republic itself.
Yet a corollary of this indispensability was that female citizenship, in order to
serve its necessary civic function in the Republic, must be exclusively social, or,
more precisely, cultivated in and confined to "civil society"-civil society most
broadly construed, but nevertheless categorically segregated not only from the
public domains of government and politics but also from some of the constituent
domains of civil society. So closely did Wilson identify society, especially "civil
society," with happiness itself that to him the realization of the felicity
63. The Visitant [No. 13], supra note 56; see also WILLIAM L. ROWE, THOMAS REID ON
FREEDOM AND MORALITY 129-30 (1991); cf D. DAICHES RAPHAEL, THE MORAL SENSE 23,
passim (1947).
64. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
65. The Visitant [No. 3], supra note 52 (emphasis added).
66. Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CuLTURE & Soc'y 37 (1987).
67. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28.
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principle-the first principle of society and government in the American
Republic-meant exalting the hearth-and, even more, the parlor-above the
forum and the agora.
I. THE "NEW" POLITICS OF "CIVIL SOCIETY" AT THE
FOUNDING
Professor Bloch, in the above-mentioned article, offers some fascinating
observations that she there only began to elaborate and illustrate. In her 1987
article she said:
The movement toward a more personal, domestic, and feminized definition
of [social] morality in the 1780s and 1790s was linked to a greater acceptance
of institutionalized public order....
The political order produced by the Constitution was designed more to
protect private virtue than to be the arena for the expression of manly virtl.60
I need not challenge these generalizations of Bloch's in arguing here that James
Wilson's social and constitutional theory-especially where they were
"synthesized" or "reconciled" in his ideas about "civil society"-do not fully
comport with her generalizations. Indeed, the changes, or developments, in his
ideas about the political significance of the social citizenship69 of men and
women, respectively, do illustrate her general appreciation of the "greater
acceptance of institutionalized public order" and a certain privatization-or at
least socialization-of civic virtue for both men and women. But what her
generalizations importantly overlook are the ramifications for reconceptualizing
the political significance of social citizenship that Professor Becker has so
effectively highlighted with his boldly synoptic account of changing conceptions
of "civil society" in the eighteenth century.
For example, in exploring what Becker sees as a largely eighteenth-century
transformation, albeit fitful, in which the term "'society' . . . lost something of
its active and immediate sense" and took on more significance as a "new social
space," Becker takes notice of some of the multiple conceptualizations of this
new social space.7" Even a single thinker like David Hume could "'think' society
as an entity transcending its individual parts" in terms of vastly different
paradigms-for example, as a "market" or as a "club."'" Moreover, the recent
work of Peter and Nicholas Onuf, like that of Becker, adds something further that
is essential (at least to understanding James Wilson's thought) in accounting for
the "movement"-the conceptual changes-about which Bloch attempted to
generalize. In discussing the Ratification debates between the Federalists and
68. Bloch, supra note 66, at 55.
69. On the liberal conception of social citizenship, especially in the context of the
Founding, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 384, passim. For both a convenient exposition and
challenging critique of T.H. Marshall's classic liberal welfare state conception of social
citizenship, see Eric Gorham, Social Citizenship and Its Fetters, 28 POLITY 25 (1995).
70. BECKER, supra note 5, at 56.
71. Id. at xiii-xiv, 55-58.
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Anti-Federalists and the famous "novelty" of a "compound" national republic
that compassed a principle of dual sovereignty at the national and state levels, the
Onufs press this insight:
Both [the Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps] could fall back on a
compound republic novel less in conception than in particular features
hammered out in Philadelphia. Historians and political theorists who
emphasize the novelty of these arrangements fail to appreciate the founders'
predilection for an old-fashioned way of thinking in which political
arrangements, however novel, must always take into account the purposive,
corporate character of social life....
The political arrangements identified with a compound republic depend
on a teleological vision in which purposive association is at the center of
human experience and social meaning.72
In my aim here to better understand Wilson's conceptions of "civil society,"
especially in their civic significances, I thus want to heed especially Becker's
emphasis on multiple, simultaneous, or chronologically overlapping paradigms
of society, and to heed the Onufs' emphasis on the significant vestiges of the
"old-fashioned" purposive, even teleological notions of social life that survived
in the admittedly novel liberal republic ingeniously contrived at the Founding.
In an earlier essay on Wilson that I wrote without the benefit of what I now
find so provocative and illuminating in the work of Bloch, Becker, the Onufs,
and others to which I shall turn here, I tried to shed some light on the political
significance for Wilson of the "polite citizenship" of men in what Wilson
considered to be a new model of civil society in America-even before the
Revolution, but all the more so as a dispensation of the Founding period. In that
earlier essay I acknowledged Wilson's "liberal creed that 'domestick society,'
that is the private social life of each individual, must be deemed intrinsically
superior in dignity to all public matters, including law and government." '73 But
there, in restricting my focus to male citizenship, I was able to offer an account
of how Wilson could harmonize the "liberal" self-regarding aspect of citizenship
in America with what he "plainly envisioned" as a "conscientious regard for the
public welfare as essential to everyday civic life in the Republic."'74
Drawing on remarks that Wilson made repeatedly on different occasions, my
earlier work stresses the effects that Wilson thought an unprecedented extension
of the right of suffrage would have in inspiring men to develop habits of reading
newspapers and the like, and addressing-in social settings-civic matters of
importance, in conversations no less pleasing and "agreeable" because they were
at the same time "instructive" and "disinterested."75 I have previously argued that
Wilson's vision of the galvanizing civic ramifications in social life of a suffrage
72. PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 69-70 (1993) (emphasis added).
73. Stephen A. Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James
Wilson's Republican Theory, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 359, 383.
74. Id.
75. WORKS, supra note 1, at 404-05 (from a passage in the 1790-1791 law lectures); id at
787-89 (from Wilson's speech of December 31, 1789, to the Pennsylvania state ratifying
convention).
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that was extended to greater numbers of the male citizenry, who under the new
national Constitution would be exercising a suffrage that would inspire an
expanded patriotism, 76 was in his day a coherent vision (however naive and
optimistic) because of the theory of human nature and conception of "civil
society" on which his vision was predicated.
But, among other things, what the ensuing work of many scholars like Ruth
Bloch, Marvin Becker, and Peter and Nicholas Onuf now demands is that, in
order to give a more historically faithful account of Wilson's elaborately
expounded social and civic theory, I must take more account of his ideas about
civil society. To Wilson, although lawyer and framer par excellence, "civil
society" was a concept even less instrumental, even more significant in itself,
than I have previously suggested. To note that Wilson, like Publius, subscribed
to the basic Lockean tenet that "civil society" precedes "civil government" in
point of time and of dignity and authoritY" is to risk overlooking the centrality
to Wilson of his concept of "civil society" as a matter both of first principle and
of political discourse.78
This centrality becomes clearer, as do the problems it raises, when we compare
and contrast what Wilson had to say, first as the Visitant and then decades later
as a law professor, on the sociology and civics of gender differentiation.
Wilson's leading modem biographer says flatly that in the essays of the Visitant
the recurrent discussions of "sex," that is, the distinctiveness of "the Fair Sex,"
proved the "most successful theme" of the essays overall.79 On the basis of the
readers' correspondence that the Visitant came to incorporate in some of the later
essays, this conclusion seems well justified."0 But the matter of gender
differentiation seems quite different-less "successful" and more
problematic-from the very outset of Wilson's law lectures.
Taken alone, Wilson's inaugural lecture, delivered on December 15, 1790,
affords an amply problematic case in point. Although the balance of the lecture
series was composed for delivery to fee-paying law students, this inaugural
lecture partook of a ceremonial address before a public audience of newsworthy
distinction. In attendance were President Washington, his wife, and a host of
other national and local dignitaries and "their ladies," who had come to pay their
respects to Wilson (by then an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court) as he thus assumed his chair as the first professor of law at the College
of Philadelphia. As his biographer again surmises, "[t]he moment was, in a sense,
the climax of [Wilson's] public career.'"'"
The ceremonial context of the occasion should hardly be ignored as part of the
explanation for what Wilson said or how he said it. In the wider context of
76. See generally Conrad, supra note 3.
77. See id.; see also text accompanying notes 124-26.
78. For the best and most recent development of essentially this same point with respect to
Wilson and Madison-as a matter of fundamental principle to them both-see Lewis, supra
note 17, at 368-69 & n.30.
79. SMITH, supra note 15, at 32-33.
80. See The Visitant [No. 7], 2 PA. CHRON., Mar. 7-14, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White).
81. SMITH, supra note 15, at 310.
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Wilson's public career as a whole, however, there are grounds for interpreting
Wilson's inaugural remarks as more than mere ceremonial rhetoric." If only in
light of the earlier essays of the Visitant, Wilson's remarks should not be passed
over as unconsidered formulaic civility. Indeed, they call to mind the pithy
formulation that "[c]ivility, the mutual recognition of each individual's innate
human dignity and membership in the political community is, as Edward Shils
has argued, at the heart of civil society and, in his words, 'at bottom the
collective consciousness of civil society." '83 But for Wilson on this occasion
there were complex and interrelated problems of civility as problems of "mutual
recognition" between speaker and audience. These problems began with simple
conventional complaisance, but they did not end there. Wilson began:
Ladies and gentlemen, though I am not unaccustomed to speak in publick,
yet, on this occasion, I rise with much diffidence to address you. The
character in which I appear is both important and new. Anxiety and
selfdistrust are natural on my first appearance. These feelings are greatly
heightened by another consideration, which operates with peculiar force. I
never before had the honour of addressing a fair audience. Anxiety and
selfdistrust, in an uncommon degree, are natural, when, for the first time, I
address a fair audience so brilliant as this is. There is one encouraging
reflection, however, which greatly supports me. The whole of my very
respectable audience is as much distinguished by its politeness as a part of it
is distinguished by its brilliancy.84
Beyond the manifest allusion in these opening remarks to a presumption of a
relationship of "trust,"8 5 a relationship that has figured prominently in what not
only Adam Seligman, but others in the Durkheimian tradition too, have lately
written about the pre-conditions and indiciae of "civil society," 6 these opening
remarks by Wilson climax with an explicit presumption of universal "politeness."
This presumption of the politeness of the entire audience implicates nothing less
than Wilson's elaborately considered theory of what "civil society" was and must
be-as fact, necessity, and norm-in the New Republic.
Indeed, in the lecture Of Man, as a Member of Society, Wilson, so unlike
Locke and Publius, in his sharply distinguishing "civil society" from "civil
government," nevertheless thoroughly identifies the concept of "civil society"
with his concept of "the state." And by the time Wilson came to pen his most
famous judicial opinion in the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, he had come
82. For an expert assessment of Wilson's rhetorical virtuosity and versatility, considered
in the context of late eighteenth-century Atlantic culture, see David Daiches, John
Witherspoon, James Wilson and the Influence of Scottish Rhetoric on America, 15
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 163, 173 (1991) (describing Wilson's "somewhat grandiloquent
and exhibitionist opening public [law] lecture").
83. SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 172.
84. WORKS, supra note 1, at 69 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
85. See id. at 232, for further, more general remarks from Wilson on "trust."
86. See SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 120-21 (discussing "'precontractural'
trust"); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (forthcoming June 1997); cf
ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SoCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 188-89 (1994). See
generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995).
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to use even the ultimate constitutive term the People as equally synonymous with
civil society and the state.87
So thoroughly did Wilson absorb into his concept of civil society so many
other keywords of contemporary civic theory that in his view, even without
benefit of civil "government" or a "constitution," a civil society/a state/a People
could become a complete "body politick" for all fundamental civic purposes:
A state [and thus a "civil society" or "a People"] may be described-a
complete body of free persons, united together for their common benefit, to
enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an
artificial person: it has an understanding and will peculiar to itself; it has its
affairs and its interests; it deliberates and resolves; it has its rules [indeed, by
definition it has laws]; it has its obligations; and it has its rights. It may
acquire property, distinct from that of its members; it may incur debts, to be
discharged out of the publick stock... ; it may be bound by contracts, and
for damages arising quasi ex contractu.88
So strong was Wilson's conception of the integral identity and practical
capability of "civil society" that it became in his view a supreme agentia 89
"moral person..... "Let government-," he said, "let even the constitution be, as
they ought to be, the handmaids; let them not be, for they ought not to be, the
mistresses of the state," or of civil society. 9' What necessarily creates the
supreme identity and capability of "civil society" is a union of "the wills and
powers of all the members," as manifested by "convention or consent." Were it
not for Wilson's deprecation of constitution and government in respect to
society, Wilson's social contract theory could at some points tempt one to think
6f Rousseau,92 in its emphasis on the respective constitutive roles of the actively
87. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793); WORKS, supra note 1, at 238-39;
cf WORKS, supra note 1, at 109, 270, 401; J.G.A. Pocock, States, Republics, and Empires: The
American Founding in Early Modern Perspective, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 55, 60-61.
88. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239 (first emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for
clarity). Nothing in the passage quoted in the text, however, gainsays Wilson's earlier remark
in his law lectures that "[g]ovemment is, indeed, highly necessary; but it is highly necessary
to a fallen state. Had man continued innocent, society, without the aids of government, would
have shed its benign influence even over the bowers of Paradise." Id. at 87. Moreover, as I
indicate infra, at 360-61, especially at note 145, Wilson considered law and legal institution
to be necessary, essential elements of"civil society" per se, before and without the institution
of "civil government."
89. See, e.g., ROWE, supra note 63, at 129-30; Timothy Duggan, Active Power and the
Liberty of Moral Agents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS-THOMAS REID: CRITICAL
INTERPRETATIONS 103, 103-12 (Stephen F. Barker & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 1976); see also
FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 153 (discussing the "dominance" in American culture of Reid's
strong position on human agency).
90. On the conception of "the state" as "a moral person"--and also as a "legal
person"-generally shared by Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Vattel, but not shared by Hume, see
Frederick G. Whelan, Hume and Contractarianism, 27 POLITY 201, 223 (1994).
91. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239.
92. Cf Garry Wills, James Wilson's New Meaning for Sovereignty, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 99-106. But see my reservations of the
volume in question expressed in Stephen A. Conrad, Conceptual Change and the Constitution,
7 CONST. COMMENTARY 197, 202 (1990) (book review).
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consenting individual and the agential collective whole: "In the social compact,
each individual engages with the whole collectively, and the whole collectively
engage with each individual. These engagements are obligatory because they are
mutual. The individuals who are not parties to them are not members of the
society."" Thus Wilson's "account of the formation of civil society,"94 as he
gives it in his lecture Of Man, as a Member of Society, would seem distinctly
voluntarist and purposive: "For by a civil society we properly understand the
voluntary union of persons in the same end, and in the same means requisite to
obtain that end."9"
III. BEYOND THE "REPUBLICAN MOTHER"
This understanding of civil society as an actively consensual union of persons
seeking a shared "end" or "purpose" pursued by means upon which there is also
common agreement is of a piece with Wilson's vision of an empirically valid
"moral science" of axiomatic first principles. It augments Wilson's credentials
as the leader among the Federalist persuasion who had the strongest faith in
direct, participatory democracy.96 But even in Wilson's early writings as the
Visitant there was an essential problematic in Wilson's recurring tendency to
conceptualize civic obligation in particular and citizenship in general as a matter
of individual, active, volitional consent. This problematic was nowhere more
evident than in the Visitant's categorical differentiation between men and women
in their roles in any public sphere, civic or social.97 Jay Fliegelman has gone so
far as to generalize about this gender differentiation in late eighteenth-century
America that, "[b]ecause [a woman] could never occupy the same positions in the
public sphere as a man, a public woman was always an object and never a
subject."9" But though Wilson, amid so many of his gallant remarks as the
Visitant, left merely implicit in his Addisonian essays of 1768 his own variation
on this tendency towards the objectification of women, he addressed the matter
directly in his inaugural law lecture.
Both the acute self-consciousness and the somewhat anxious consciousness of
his audience that he displayed in his opening remarks, which I have already
quoted, were recurrently evident in his lecture. He was quick, for example, to pay
conventionally allusive homage to President Washington as "THE MOST
93. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity).
94. Id. at 240.
95. Id. at 239 (punctuation modernized for clarity); cf id. at 242 ("[Sjociety is constituted
for a certain purpose."); Greene, supra note 8, at 379 ("The products of necessity and volition,
the free segments of the new societies of colonial British America were, preeminently, societies
of independent freeholding families composed of 'free and independent m[e]n' and women
deeply engaged, as I have argued elsewhere, in their pursuits of individual happiness.")
(footnotes omitted).
96. See McCloskey, supra note 15, at 14-17. The most convenient collection of
documentary evidence for this point is GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 42-69, 122-40 (1978).
97. See, e.g, The Visitant [No. 9], 2 PA. CHRON., Mar. 21, 1768 (James Wilson & William
White).
98. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 130. Contra Lewis, supra note 17, at 367 ("In some
clear, if unspecified way, women were members of political society .... ).
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WORTHY" figure in the already illustrious historic pantheon of American
patriots and heroes.99 But his manifestly calculated rhetoric did not, as I have
said, remain conventionally formulaic throughout. In the entire lecture what
might have been most distinctive is how and why Wilson went out of his way to
justify categorically excluding from any agential presence in one very important
element of the public sphere, the element of legal culture-an element in which,
in his view, "civil society" and "civil government" profoundly informed one
another-those persons he since 1768 had and still professed to esteem as the
better half of the American population. As one scholar who has surveyed the
topic tells us of the Founding era more generally, "[t]he exclusion of females
from the body politic was rarely discussed," at least by the founding fathers; 0
Wilson, like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, was one of the "few exceptions"
in this respect.' '
On December 15, 1790, Wilson's by then well-known advocacy of popular
democracy, in his political and constitutional theory, and his professedly
egalitarian0 2 concept of "civil society," which he was to develop in his law
lectures, posed for him a complex problem: how both to welcome the sizable
number of distinguished women in the audience for his inaugural lecture, and at
the same time to explain why none of these women, no matter how "brilliant,"
belonged in his audience once the regular course of lectures in legal education
got underway. Indeed, after he had dwelled on the importance of education in
general, but especially civic education, in a republic-with his remarks couched,
unsurprisingly, in terms of respect for classical antiquity as exemplar° 3-he
confronted the problem that little he had said thus far, since his opening
salutation "Ladies and gentlemen," had been addressed to the many women in his
audience. He said abruptly:
99. WORKS, supra note 1, at 71-72.
100. Linda Kerber, "History Can Do It No Justice": Women and the Reinterpretation of the
American Revolution, in WOMEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3, 35 (Ronald
Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1989); cf. Lewis, supra note 17, at 381; id. at 360 (quoting
Richard B. Morris).
101. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the
Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S
DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247
(1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed
audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the
maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on
women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and
the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-
77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DuBoIs, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a
number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United
People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
102. WORKS, supra note 1, at 241.
103. See generally CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME,
AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994).
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Methinks I hear one of the female part of my audience exclaim-What is all
this to us? We have heard much of societies, of states, of governments, of
laws, and of legal education. Is every thing made for your sex? Why should
not we have a share? Is our sex less honest, or less virtuous, or less wise than
yours?' 04
And he immediately began to answer these presumed challenges, after he rather
congratulated himself for doing so: "Will any of my brethren be kind enough to
furnish me with answers to these questions?-I must answer them, it seems,
myself? and I mean to answer them most sincerely."10 5
That Wilson forthrightly confronted this matter of exclusion is interesting in
itself; his strategy for answering his questions is even more interesting. He began
by saying to his female audience: "Your sex is neither less honest, nor less
virtuous, nor less wise than ours. With regard to the two first of these qualities,
a superiority on our part will not be pretended: with regard to the last, a
pretension of superiority cannot be supported."'0 6 In so saying Wilson
distinguished his approach to the problem at hand from that taken by some others
of his era. Much of the difference turns on his distinction between "honesty" and
"virtue," on the one hand, and "wisdom," on the other.
As many historians have persuasively argued, especially since 1980, when
Linda Kerber published Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in
Revolutionary America,10 7 it seems that virtually all the men"0 8 of Wilson's day
saw the exclusion of women from participatory political citizenship as a requisite
means of protecting a unique and essential wellspring of civic virtue from the
corrupting effects of direct exposure to the forum and the agora. This view found
its fullest expression in what Kerber has explicated as the pervasive myth and
iconography of the "Republican Mother." Historians like Ruth Bloch,' 9 Mary
Beth Norton, "o Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "' Jan Lewis, 2 Rosemarie Zagarri, "3
and others including Kerber herself, 14 have elaborated upon and refined Kerber's
104. WORKS, supra note 1, at 85.
105. Id. at 86.
106. Id. (punctuation modernized for clarity).
107. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1980).
108. On the views in this matter of an American woman of the time who achieved
exceptional civic distinction, even prominence, see ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, A WOMAN'S
DILEMMA: MERCY OTIS WARREN AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72-77 (1995).
109. In addition to the article already cited, see Ruth H. Bloch, American Feminine Ideals
in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815, 4 FEMINIST STUD., June 1978, at 101.
110. In addition to the book cited above, see Mary Beth Norton, The Evolution of White
"Women's Experience in Early America, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 593 (1984).
111. See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Dis-Covering the Subject of the "Great Constitutional
Discussion, " 1786-1789, 79 J. AM. HIST. 841 (1992).
112. Jan Lewis, The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic, 44 WM.
& MARY Q. 689 (1987).
113. Rosemarie Zagarri, Morals, Manners, and the Republican Mother, 44 AM. Q. 192
(1992).
114. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber et al., Forum-Beyond Roles, Beyond Spheres: Thinking
About Gender in the Early Republic, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 565 (1989).
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original insights. And Gordon Wood has incorporated these insights into his
Pulitzer-Prize-winning reconsideration of the last several decades of scholarship
on the American Revolution." 5 But Kerber's classic original formulation is still
worth quoting at length:
The paired female images of so many engravings of the Revolutionary era that
show both Minerva... and Columbia, surrounded by emblems of domestic
work and prosperity, suggest the difficulty of merging the two themes [of
citizenship and domesticity. During the early republic a] synthesis was
needed that would facilitate women's entry into politics without denying
women's commitment to domesticity. The search for this synthesis has
permeated women's history in America from the time of the Revolution to our
own .... [In the early Republic the] role of guarantor of civic virtue...
could not be assigned to a formal branch of government. Instead it was hoped
that other agencies-churches, schools, and families-would fulfill that
function. And within families, the crucial role was thought to be the mother's:
the mother who trained her children, taught them their early lessons, shaped
their moral choices .... Motherhood was discussed almost as if it were a
fourth branch of government, a device that ensured social control in the
gentlest possible way.... The Republican Mother was to encourage in her
sons civic interest and participation. She was to educate her children and
guide them in the paths of morality and virtue. But she was not to tell her
male relatives for whom to vote. She was a citizen but not really a
constituent."1
6
Kerber's understanding of female citizenship in the new American nation as
derived from, or at least analogized to, the role of Republican Motherhood has
become a prevailing-although not altogether unchallenged' '7 -historiographical
orthodoxy, at least as far as it goes." 8 But when Kerber's interpretation, as she
115. RADICALISM, supra note 7, at 356-57.
116. KERBER, supra note 107, at xii, 199-200, 283 (footnote omitted).
117. The most significant challenge, or alternative perspective, has come recently from Jan
Lewis, in her article largely devoted to Wilson. Emphasizing "the distinction between a
republican and liberal understanding of citizenship" and highlighting the liberal rather than the
republican character of Wilson's civic theory, Lewis writes:
According to the tenets of republicanism, participation in the republic, and not
simply voting, should have been restricted only to those who held enough
property to secure a stake in the community and maintain their independence.
Nascent liberals such as Wilson and Madison thought of the nation in much more
expansive terms. Every free person who inhabited it was, in fact, a citizen,
deserving of its protection and entitled to representation in the halls of
government. In this context, women, who explicitly were to be represented but
who just as explicitly were not permitted to represent themselves, became the
touchstone of the modem, liberal state. By construing women as interested
citizens incapable of representing themselves, liberalism provided ajustification
for the state: protecting those who could not protect themselves.
Lewis, supra note 17, at 368-69 & n.30.
118. For a recent, wide-ranging sample of scholarship that reviews and reconsiders the
general topic in question, see Carole Shammas, Anglo-American Household Government in
Comparative Perspective, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 104, 128-44 (1995). And of special interest for
my purposes is the following criticism of Kerber: "In her treatment of the Enlightenment,
Kerber scants the contributions of the Scots, devoting only one highly critical paragraph to
Lord Kames." Zagarri, supra note 113, at 211 n.5 (citations omitted).
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and others have elaborated it, is reexamined on its own terms and especially in
light, of Wilson's words, it would seem that Kerber's interpretation and its
progeny all slight something that they nonetheless recognize. And it is something
that Wilson, for one, pointedly emphasized: Even more than the "virtue," that is,
the other-regarding neo-classical civic virtue associated during the early
Republic with the female sex (or at least with white, middle-class women at some
times and in some regions 1 9), and even more than women's "honesty," which in
Wilson's day was still a synonym for civic rectitude and probity, Wilson
emphasized that, as an empirical matter-as an evident social fact-women were
hardly less "wise" than men.
As explicitly indicated in the long passage quoted above, Professor Kerber
recognizes the prominence of the image of Minerva in the iconography of the
early national period; and yet she and those who have followed her lead omit
from their interpretive matrix (perhaps because of a recent historiographical
climate that has made so much of the problematics of "domesticity" and of
allocentric "civic virtue"'20) any sustained attention to this essential element of
"wisdom" in republican citizenship. For the American founding fathers,
however, anxious concern about where to find sufficient wisdom to secure and
cultivate republicanism in the new nation was a fundamental problem in classical
and early-modern republican theory.' As Wilson put the matter, while the
"goodness," or virtue, of "the people at large"-that is American society-must
be the basis of the Republic, "wisdom," together with "strength," must be one of
the twin "pillars" upon which any truly republican government would be
"erected."' 22
Immediately faced with another problem, the awkward task of greeting and
then virtually dismissing his female audience on December 15, 1790, Wilson
turned this problem of wisdom into a rhetorical opportunity. It was an
opportunity for Wilson to begin to explain how and why he could postulate as a
developing empirical reality the sort of "civil society" in America that was to him
the necessary foundation of American republicanism.
For in digressing from his introductory remarks on the importance of the study
of the "science" of law, he adverted to his female audience with the
119. See, for example, some of the recently emphasized distinctions as to race, class,
religion, region, and time period including SUSAN JUSTER, DISORDERLY WOMEN: SEXUAL
POLITICS AND EVANGELICALISM IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND (1994) (addressing
religion, region, and men using the feminine language of community) and Norton, supra note
110. On class, see ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, 1785-1850, at 117 & n.13
(1989).
120. E.g., MARK E. KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIvIc VIRTUE IN AMERICA
245-69 (199 1) ('The Keepers of Civic Virtue").
121. See, e.g., THEFEDERALISTNO. 6, supra note 19, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
"[p]erfect wisdom and perfect virtue"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 19, at 62 (James
Madison) (discussing "wisdom" of the chosen body); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 19,
at 230 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[I]f we have wisdom and virtue enough . . . ."); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 19, at 591 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing "good sense and
wisdom").
122. WORKS, supra note 1, at 303.
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Montesquieuean'" question, "What are laws without manners?"'24 Thus, to
borrow language that Professor Pocock has used with reference to Edmund
Burke, 2 ' Wilson at a stroke removed the topic of law "from the key of
jurisprudence [as traditionally conceived] to that of culture.""26 The way was then
open for Wilson to attenuate his problem of postulating an American civil society
sufficient to the needs of his republican constitutional theory by sublimating 27
female social citizenship above even the "economics of virtue" ' into the
essential political resource of "wisdom."
Wilson was no Burkean (although in some respects he might be understood as
something of a republican American counterpait of Burke 29). Wilson thoroughly
subscribed to the late eighteenth-century natural rights doctrine that Burke so
thoroughly and eloquently rejected. Thus Wilson abhorred nothing more than the
prescriptive constitutionalism of which Burke became one of the most insidious
(because one of the most eloquent) advocates, just at the moment when
Americans, in Wilson's view, were trying to redeem the full promise of
republicanism for the first time in human history. He was convinced that the
American Founding and its survival depended on the precious, if not historically
miraculous, resource of "the politics of discussion." ' Wilson proudly remarked
of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and the ensuing Ratification process:
After a period of six thousand years has elapsed since the Creation, the
United States exhibit to the world the first instance, as far as we can learn, of
a nation, unattacked by external force, unconvulsed by domestic
insurrections, assembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, and deciding calmly,
123. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 7 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Hafner Publishing Company 1949) (1748), where Montesquieu stated that throughout his study
he had by design:
[N]ot separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to treat
of laws, but of their spirit; and as the spirit consists in the various relations which
the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the
natural order of laws as that of these relations and objects.
124. WORKS, supra note 1, at 85.
125. In Letters on a Regicide Peace (1790), Burke wrote, "'Manners are of more importance
than the laws... [because manners] aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy
them."' J.G.A. POCOCK, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political
Thought, in VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLrICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY,
CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 37, 49 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1985).
126. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW-A REIssUE WITH
A RETROSPECT 382 (1987).
127. For Wilson's sublimating conception of marriage, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 379-80.
For Wilson's sublimating conception of "revolution," see Dennison, supra note 10, at 175-76.
See generally George Dargo, Parties and the Transformation of the Constitutional Idea in
Revolutionary Pennsylvania, in PARTY AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 98, 111 (Patricia U. Bonomi ed., 1980) (discussing the "'sublimation of politics'
in late eighteenth-century America).
128. I borrow this term from Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALEL.J. 1013, 1031 (1984).
129. See Stephen A. Conrad, James Wilson's "Assimilation of the Common-Law Mind", 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 186, 196, 208 (1989).
130. 1 borrow this phrase from Samuel H. Beer in conversation.
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concerning that system of government under which they would wish that they
and their posterity should live.' 3
This American breakthrough in accomplishing a civic founding by means of
the politics of discussion, which had been and continued to be inculcated by the
habits and resources of life in a polite, civil society, was thus hardly something
Wilson took for granted. In fact, during the course of his lecture Of Man, as a
Member of Society, he adverted to one of the most effective contemporary
challenges to his characterization of the American Revolutionary settlement as
a civic founding achieved by an established civil society that had harnessed its
deliberative and discursive resources to the task. The challenger was William
Paley, an otherwise "sensible and ingenious writer,"'3 who had written in his
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) that it was idle fancy to
imagine that the formation of a "civil government" could ever originate from an
"antecedent" civil society based on an "original convention of the people."'3 3 It
is interesting to read the passage from. Paley that Wilson cited but did not quote,
because how Wilson would have answered Paley-or did answer him implicitly
in his discussion of civil society in the law lecture in question-raises into sharp
relief the problems with which Wilson had to cope in his optimistic yet anxious
faith in the constitutive capability of civil society. Paley had insisted:
[N]p government in the universe began from this original [a merely social
convention of the people]. Some imitation of a social compact may have
taken place at a Revolution. The present age has been witness to a transaction
which bears the nearest resemblance to this political idea of any of which
history has preserved the account or memory. I refer to the establishment of
the united states of North America. We saw the people assembled to elect
deputies, for the avowed purpose of framing the constitution of a new empire.
We saw this deputation of the people deliberating and resolving upon a form
of government, erecting a permanent legislature, distributing the functions of
sovereignty, establishing and promulgating a code of fundamental ordinances,
which were to be considered by succeeding generations, not merely as laws
and acts of the state,.., but as limitations of power, which were to controul
and regulate the future legislature.-Yet even here much was
presupposed.-In settling the constitution many important parts were
presumed to be already settled-the qualifications of the constituents who
were admitted to vote in the election of members of Congress, as well as the
mode of electing representatives, were taken from the old forms of
131. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME
II: RATIFICATION BY THE STATES- PENNSYLVANIA 353 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (punctuation modernized for clarity). Compare a quite similar
passage in the law lectures, WORKS, supra note 1, at 284.
132. WORKS, supra note 1, at 240. Compare Professor Pocock's pithy generalization about
Britain in the mid-1780s: "In the domain of philosophy, the reality of divine will and the
autonomy of moral values were being asserted in terms calculated to reinforce the authority of
society; the advent of Scottish commonsense philosophy and the rapid adoption of William
Paley's writings into the Cambridge curriculum are instances of this." J.G.A. POCOCK, The
Varieties of Whiggism From Exclusion to Reform, in VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY:
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, supra
note 125, at 215, 278 (emphasis added).
133. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 416-17
(photo. reprint 1978) (London, n.p. 1785).
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government. That was wanting from which every social union should set off,
and which alone makes the resolutions of the society the act of individual, the
unconstrained consent of all, to be bound by the decision of the majority; and
yet, without this previous consent, the revolt, and the regulations which
followed it, were compulsory upon dissentients.'
As I have remarked, Wilson repeatedly insisted that the formation of a
distinctive American civil society predated the Revolution. Indeed, he insisted
at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that when the American colonies had
declared their independence from Britain they had done so "Unitedly" as one
People, one integral civil society already functioning as a body politic.'35 And
Wilson characteristically professed an ardent optimism about the capability of
that pre-Revolutionary and enduring American civil society to meet the civic
demands of the regime of republican government projected by the several state
constitutions and the Federal Constitution of 1787. His fundamental reliance on
"civil society" in this respect made it all the more important for him to
distinguish conceptions of civil society that were proper to American
constitutional republicanism from conceptions that posed a threat to it. He
thought that one of the greatest threats to American republicanism came from the
conception of civil society espoused by Burke and Blackstone, precisely because
they estimated the constitutive capability of civil society to be even greater than,
or at least very different from, what he felt it ever could or should be.
It was this problem-the challenge from Burke and Blackstone and their
epigones-that required Wilson ultimately to acknowledge and even emphasize
the constitutive limitations of civil society. Indeed, he did so with a vehemence
that might seem at odds with so much of what he otherwise had to say about the
immanent "original powers of Society," as the source and genius of American
republicanism, that superseded in authority even the Constitution-and even "a
scrupulous regard to ordinary rights."'36 But the explanation for Wilson's
occasional relegation of "society" to a second order of authority in his civic
theory turns precisely on his idea of immanence. It was an idea of immanence
that he took, again, from the Scottish Enlightenment in America. This was an
idea that synthesized and exalted the authority of Nature and Nature's God in a
way that preserved for American republicanism the "natural rights" tradition
from its English detractors. 3 '
When Burke said, as Wilson quoted him, "'It is the civil social man.., and no
other, whom I have in my contemplation,"" 3 8 it was crucially important for
Wilson to distinguish that point of view from his own. Wilson went as far as to
say, "it is but candid to consider human nature in her improved, and not in her
most rude or depraved forms. 'The good experienced man,' says Aristotle, 'is the
134. Id. (punctuation modernized for clarity).
135. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 35, at 324.
136. 2 id. at 469 (emphasis added).
137. I use this crucial word "immanence" in the sense in which it is so aptly applied to
Thomas Reid's theistically informed idea of the authority of nature in P.M. Heimann,
Voluntarism and Immanence: Conceptions of Nature in Eighteenth Century Thought, 39 J.
HiST. IDEAS 271, 278-79 (1978).
138. WORKS, supra note 1, at 589 (emphasis in original).
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last measure of all things.""' 39 For all Wilson's reliance on the authority of civil
society, properly conceived-that is, conceived with an emphasis on individual
human nature as reciprocally constituting and constituted by civil
society-nevertheless, in his civic theory he could not rely on the authority of
civil society per se exclusively, as did Burke and Blackstone--or, better to say,
he could not rely on it in the way that they did.
In a word, their conception of "civil society" was essentially artificial, whereas
Wilson's was essentially naturalistic, albeit in ways that "historicized" the
authority of nature by portraying civil society as "a process by which
fundamental [that is, natural] principles were made concrete in the course of
history itself."'40 To Wilson, the excellence and capability of civil society derived
from its immanent character and function: Civil society was the
institutionalization and the process-the immanence-of individual human
nature and natural society in the process of reaching their intrinsic potential for
improvement. In civil society, then, nature was not transcended but, rather, was
itself ever more fully realized. To assert to the contrary, as did Burke and
Blackstone, was to deny the reality' 4' of "natural law" and "natural liberty" and
"natural rights." All these, Wilson insisted-law, liberty, and fundamental
rights-must never be dislodged from "the stable foundation of nature."' 42 If
Burke and Blackstone's deracinated conception of civil society:
be a just view of things, then .. .[t]he connexion between man and his
natural rights is intercepted by civil society .... [And] then, under civil
society, man is not only madefor, but made by the government: he is nothing
but what the society frames: he can claim nothing but what the society
provides. His natural state and his natural rights are withdrawn altogether
from notice.' 43
IV. NATURE, "SENSE," AND THE RHETORICAL
CONSTITUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Against the artificial, positivist conception of civil society in its civic
significance as espoused by those arch anti-republicans Burke and Blackstone,
Wilson posited and defended a conception of civil society that he claimed to
derive largely from that paragon of republican lawyers Cicero.' In Wilson's
Ciceronian conception of civil society, law and legal institutions-although
again, not civil government-were necessary, essential elements:
139. Id at 139. On Wilson's conception of "the good experienced," as taken from Aristotle
via Francis Hutcheson, see WHITE, supra note 28, at 134-35; cf id. at 101.
140. Lester H. Cohen, The American Revolution and Natural Law Theory, 39 J. HIST. IDEAS
491, 497 (1978); cf Dennison, supra note 10, at 178.
141. For background on eighteenth-century "realism," see I ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY
G. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 215-241 (1977).
142. WORKS, supra note 1, at 587-88.
143. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
144. See Stephen Botein, Cicero as Role Modelfor Early American Lawyers: A Case Study
in Classical "Influence ", 73 CLASSICAL J. 313 (1978).
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To civil society, indeed, without including in its description the idea of civil
government, the name of state may be assigned, by way of excellence. It is in
this sense that Cicero seems to use it in the following beautiful passage.
"Nothing, which is exhibited on our globe, is more acceptable to that divinity
which governs the whole universe than those communities and assemblages
of men, which, lawfully associated,-jure sociati [sic]-are denominated
states.
143
Cicero, together with the Alexander Pope of The Essay on Man and so many
of the less poetic British moralists of the eighteenth century, ranked among
Wilson's favorite expositors of the naturalness of social life by locating the basis
for society in individual human nature. 46 Wilson accorded distinctive authority
to Cicero's guidance because Cicero "knew so well how to illustrate law by
philosophy."'' 4' As in the case of the poet Pope, so in the case of Cicero, it was
masterful rhetoric that was the chief object of Wilson's admiration. To Wilson
Cicero excelled so greatly not in his originality, reasoning, or even his erudition,
but rather in his skill at "illustrating"-in the Latinate sense, bringing to
light-with his eloquence those "truths" and "certainties" the authority of which
was, when thus illustrated, utterly self-evident. This authority, as Wilson quoted
Cicero, partook of an epistemology of self-evident truth that Cicero ascribed to
Plato.4 1 In our own day Hannah Arendt has similarly associated Plato's concept
of an effectively legitimating "source of authority" for government and laws with
a "subsuming" naturalistic "rule of reason or common sense," which, "like the
law of nature or the commands of God, must not be man-made."'49
In any event, Wilson's social and constitutional theory were suffused with the
authoritativeness of common sense naturalism. It is fitting, then, for Adam
Seligman to select Wilson as a spokesman for late eighteenth-century American
notions that:
[T]he law of nature, posited as superior to any other, is woven into the
fundamental terms of the civic polity.... For Wilson, as for other judges and
lawyers of the last decade of the eighteenth century, the law of nature was
"immutable, not by the effect of arbitrary disposition but because it has its
foundation in the natural constitution and mutual relations of men and
things."1
5 0
145. WORKS, supra note 1, at 238-39 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity);
cf id. at 280 (discussing judicial administration of the law). Additionally, compare various
remarks by Wilson in the Pennsylvania Ratification debates found 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 131, at 344-45, 346, 356, 358-59.
146. See, e.g., WORKS, supra note 1, at 236-37. This is a point of special interest and
importance to Adam Seligman in his "Afterword" to this Symposium. See Adam B. Seligman,
Individualism as Principle: Its Emergence, Institutionalization, and Contradictions, 72 IND.
L.J. 503 (1997).
147. WORKS, supra note 1, at 236.
148. See id.
149. HANNAH ARENDT, What is Authority, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES
IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 110-11 (Viking Press 1968) (1954) (emphasis added).
150. SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 81 (quoting Wilson, in his Lectures on
Law).
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And so subsuming was Wilson's naturalism, as Seligman also notes, that it
reflected the "unique interweaving of religious and civil traditions that
characterized the civil society tradition in the United States" by taking as
axiomatic the "unity" of "the law of nature and the law of revelation."',
Cicero's eloquence and his legendary republican stature thus served Wilson
well in his attempt, in his own republican theory, to preserve "law" as a hallmark
of "civil society."' 52 At the same time Wilson, invoking Cicero, mitigated the
importance of legalism' by elucidating ("illustrating") the basis of civil society
in human nature and the natural sociability in human relations as phenomena
"acceptable to that divinity, which governs the whole universe." Hence it was all
the more appropriate that Wilson turned extensively to Cicero in explaining the
exclusion of women from the legal culture-as a necessary function of their
unique contribution to maintaining the society that in the Republic was, and must
naturally take its place, above the civic arena.
In his inaugural law lecture Wilson laid the groundwork for this
characteristically Ciceronian turn by acknowledging that there were historically
well-known women who had proved not only by opportunity "accomplished" but
by character "able" as civic leaders. He cited three uncontestable examples:
"Semiramis of Ninevah; Zenobia, the queen of the east; and Elizabeth of
England."'5 4 Yet, to Wilson, all three of these "characters... had ... too much
of the masculine in them."'5 5 Women, Wilson contended, were not made [by the
"governing divinity"] for "the management of publick affairs.... [T]hey were
made for something better." And of that something better, he told his female
audience, "you form the better part-I mean society-I mean particularly
domestick society: there the lovely woman shines with superiour lustre."'5 6
In short order Wilson proceeded to invoke the liberal republican tenet that the
realm of society is superior to the realm of government, and that government is
necessary to society only because humankind exists on earth in "a fallen state."'5' 7
Thereupon Wilson rhapsodized at-length, gallantly and poetically (quoting
151. Id. at 83. I believe that the most extensive treatment of this topic in print remains MAY
G. O'DONNELL, JAMES WILSON AND THE NATURAL LAW BASIS OF POSITIvE LAw (1937); see
also HAAKONSSEN, supra note 38, at 312-13 (discussing Wilson's embrace of "the usual
combination of moral realism and Christian utilitarianism" of Thomas Rutherforth, whom
Wilson took "as a household name amongst his educated audience"); cf WHITE, supra note 28,
at 227.
152. WORKS, supra note 1, at 238-39,280; cf 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 131,
at 344-46, 356, 358-59.
153. At times Wilson went beyond mitigating the importance of legalism to express evident
reservations about legalism per se as a value or end itself. After all, said Wilson at one point,
"the citizen was made for the sake of the man .... If a law is even harmless, the very
circumstance of its being a law, is itself a harm." WORKS, supra note 1, at 579.
154. Id. at 86.
155. Id. This passage is noticed by ZAGARRI, supra note 108, at 72 and Zagarri, supra note
113, at 207-08.
156. WORKS, supra note 1, at 86; see also infra text accompanying notes 203-14 (discussing
both Wilson and Greene on the constitutive importance of the wider domains of civil society
beyond the family).
157. WORKS, supra note 1, at 87.
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Milton for a poetic climax), upon the theme of female beauty as evinced most
compellingly "[t]hough the bloom of youth be faded [in] the beaming emanations
of the mind" of a mature woman."8 To acknowledge these distinctive emanations
of the female mind was to acknowledge "the important purposes which female
virtue is fitted and intended to accomplish [in] a good system of law and
government."'' 9
With all this said, Wilson was prepared at last for his Ciceronian turn, a turn
that economizes to good effect on the recurring argument of "social feminism""
that women are more virtuous than men, provided women remain removed from
the competition of the marketplace, 6 ' the contentiousness of politics, and the
conflict of the battlefield. But the historically recurring paradigmatic argument
of social feminism is not precisely the argument Wilson ultimately makes. Nor,
for all he says, is his argument faithfully Ciceronian. Wilson's is an argument
that takes Cicero's words out of their own context and changes their meaning by
using Cicero's rhetoric in a way Wilson thought justified by the best principles
of the scientific Common Sense philosophy of his time.
Here in its entirety is Wilson's ostensibly Ciceronian encomium to his female
audience:
To protect and to improve social life, is, as we have seen, the end of
government and law. If, therefore, you have no share in the formation, you
have a most intimate connexion with the effects, of a good system of law and
government.
That plan of education which will produce, or promote, or preserve such
a system is consequently, an object to you parculiarly important. But if you
would see such a plan carried into complete effect, you must, my amiable
hearers, give it your powerful assistance. The pleasing task of forming your
daughters is almost solely yours. In my plan of education of your sons, I must
solicit you to cooperate. Their virtues, in a certain proportion-the
refinement of their virtues, in a much greater proportion, must be moulded by
your example.
In your sex, too, there is a natural, an easy, and often a pure flow of
diction, which lays the best foundation of that eloquence, which, in a free
country, is so important to ours.
The style of some of the finest orators of antiquity was originally formed
on that of their mothers, or of other ladies to whose acquaintance they had the
honour of being introduced. I have already mentioned the two Scevolae
among the illustrious Roman characters. One of them was married to Laelia,
a lady whose virtues and accomplishments rendered her one of the principal
ornaments of Rome. She possessed the elegance of language in so eminent a
degree that the first speakers of the age were ambitious of her company. The
158. Id. at 87-88.
159. Id. (punctuation modernized for clarity).
160. See generally NAOMI BLACK, SOCIAL FEMINISM (1989); JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC
MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (198 1).
161. For telling evidence of the social reality of women's complex roles in "commerce"' in
the 1790s in America, see the recent article by Susan Branson, Women and the Family
Economy in the Early Republic: The Case of Elizabeth Meredith, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 47
(1996).
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graces of her unstudied elocution were the purest model by which they could
refine their own.
Cicero was in the number of those who improved by the privilege of her
conversation. In his writings he speaks in terms of the warmest praise
concerning her singular talents. He mentions also the conversation of her
daughters and grand daughters as deserving particular notice.
The province of early education by the female sex was deemed, in Rome,
an employment of so much dignity that ladies of the first rank did not disdain
it. We find the names of Aurelia and Attia, the mothers of Julius Caesar and
of Augustus, enumerated in the list of these honourable patronesses of
education. The example of the highly accomplished Cornelia, the daughter of
the great Africanus, and the mother of the Gracchi, deserves uncommon
attention. She shone, with singular lustre, in all these endowments and virtues
that can dignify the female character .... Cicero had seen her letters: his
expressions concerning them are very remarkable. "I have read," says he, "the
letters of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi; and it appears, that her sons
were not so much nourished by the milk, as formed by the style of their
mother."' 62
Here Wilson is drawing on Cicero's philosophical essay Brutus, composed in
46 B.C. as a survey of Greek and Roman eloquence. When one consults Cicero's
own text, however, one sees that Wilson, in his selective quotation and
paraphrase of Cicero, changes Cicero's meaning 63 when Wilson associates
exclusively with women the eloquence and conversational style that Wilson
praises. Cicero for his part finds it "obvious" that Laelia's eloquence "echoed the
elegance of her father's diction."'"
Thus, to Cicero, there was nothing necessarily distinctive or unique about
women's capacity with respect to sermo, which Wilson translates as style, and
which he correctly associates with ordinary and informal speech-that is,
conversation-as contrasted with oratio, oratory, which proceeds by formal
rules.
The language of common speech in a social setting is what sermo denotes, as
contrasted with the setting of contentio, which is the assertive, argumentative
context of oratio. Thus the Latin word sermo does connote style and can be so
translated. It is style of a particular sort. It is style that aims at elegance in the
social significance of the term elegance, in other words, the achievement of
complaisance, which itself is a procedure of mediating between and among
individuals, as conversational interlocutors, by putting a premium on the
associative, often shared even if unconsciously shared, standards of taste. 6
162. WORKS, supra note 1, at 88-89 (emphasis added) (punctuation and paragraph structure
modernized for clarity). On parts of this passage, see the comments of RICHARD, supra note
103, at 72-73.
163. Compare the more general remark in PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND
MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 565 (1992) ("Wilson
thought it proper to exalt the status of women in a fashion utterly foreign to classical
antiquity .... ).
164. MARCUS TuLLIUS CICERO, BRUTUS; ON THE NATURE OF THE GODS; ON DIVINATION; ON
DUTIES 131 (Hubert M. Poteat trans., University of Chicago Press 1950).
165. The Visitant [No. 2], supra note 51.
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In the pre-Revolutionary Addisonian essays of the Visitant in 1768, Wilson
had made his case that the conversation of women generally offers more "good
sense," more wisdom, than that of philosophers precisely because the moral
perception evinced in the sensible woman's conversation is closer to nature. By
1790, in a greatly changed civic context, where both the manners and the
constitutional regime of Americans had become thoroughly republican, 66 the
significance of female conversation and eloquence as a fund of social wisdom 67
had accordingly become so much more important as to seem to Wilson-in
theory-a civic necessity. In the new American nation, civil society as an
institution took on a significance epitomized by Wilson's defense of natural
rights, natural law, and the sociability intrinsic to human nature-in response to
various challenges. These challenges came not only from the anti-republican
arguments of Burke and Blackstone, but also from friendly skeptics like Paley,
who doubted that even in America any civil society, as a social union, had the
constitutive capability to create a republic by means of a "conservative"'
168
revolution. Yet it was this constitutive capability of civil society, conserving and
economizing on its cultivated natural civic resources, that was thus fundamental
to Wilson's American republicanism:
In many parts of the world, indeed, the idea of revolutions in government is,
by mournful and indissoluble association, connected with the idea of wars,
and all the calamaties attendant on wars. But joyful experience teaches us, in
the United States, to view them in a very different and much more agreeable
light-to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge
of government and increasing the happiness of society and mankind. It is true
that institutions which depend on the form or structure of the preceding
government must fall when that form or structure is taken away. But
establishments whose foundations rest on the society itself cannot be
overturned by any alteration of the government which the society can make.'69
To Wilson the institution of "civil society" in the new Republic was not only
fundamental, and not only "interwoven," as Seligman shows, with the authority
of nature-including the moral authority of the original "natural language" of
mankind 7 ' and of revealed religion-but also with a style that the Visitant and
others called "politeness." American Independence and American Republicanism
notwithstanding, in the shared extra-political Atlantic culture of the late
eighteenth century, 7 ' in America, as in Britain, there remained some truth to the
166. See Russell L. Hanson, "Commons" and "Commonwealth" at the American Founding:
Democratic Republicanism as the New American Hybrid, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 165, 167.
167. See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson's view of the common
law as "funded social wisdom").
168. See Dennison, supra note 10, at 177-78; cf TERENCE MARTIN, THE INSTRUCTED
VISION: SCOTISH COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY AND THE ORIGINs OF AMERICAN FICTION 12
(1961).
169. WORKS, supra note 1, at 284 (emphasis added) (punctuation and paragraph structure
modernized for clarity); cf id. at 770-71 (Wilson's November 26, 1787, speech in the
Pennsylvania convention).
170. Schreyer, supra note 33, at 157-58.
171. WORKS, supra note 1, at 229.
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late Augustan maxim that "[s]tyles and institutions [were] ultimately the same
thing."'7
2
To borrow a cleverly phrased insight from the literary historian Daniel Cottom,
in Wilson's view of the social, and thus also necessarily the civic, significance
of the polite style and good sense of the female citizenry of the Republic, "taste"
became more than "an alphabetical anagram" of "state"; it became a metaphor or
analog for what Wilson meant by "state."' 173 Cottom quotes Schiller as saying of
"the beautiful"-but, in different words, Wilson's master Thomas Reid argued
for the same proposition: 74 "[T]aste alone brings harmony into society, because
it gives harmony to the individual.... [O]nly communication of the beautiful
unites society, because it refers to that which is common to all.', 175 As we have
seen, what Wilson found distinctively beautiful in this respect was something he
identified with the good sense, and more particularly with the sensible,
conversational eloquence of the mature (that is, well socialized) members of the
"fair sex." In Wilson's vision of American civil society at the Founding, as he
said in one of his law lectures: "A union of hearts and affections, as well as a
union of counsels and interests, is the very soul of a confederated republick. This
is a subject on which it is almost impossible to say too much, or to speak with too
much zeal."" And in his inaugural lecture he attempted at least to begin to
explain how and why such a civil society as an affective union must be
rhetorically constituted in a way that relied on women to cultivate and inculcate
social wisdom and socializing eloquence by eschewing any "particular
character"-even the character of one knowledgeable (as every American male
citizen should be 177) in a matter so essential to civil society as law.
172. PAUL FUSSELL, THE RHETORICAL WORLD OF AUGUSTAN HUMANISM: ETHICS AND
IMAGERY FROM SWIFT TO BURKE 232 (1965).
173. DANIEL COTTOM, THE CIVILIZED IMAGINATION: A STUDY OF ANN RADCLIFFE, JANE
AUSTEN, AND WALTER SCOTT 24 (1985).
174. Peter Kivy, The Logic of Taste: Reid and the Second Fifty Years, in THOMAS REID:
CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS 113, 120 (Stephen F. Barker & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 1976).
175. COTTOM, supra note 173, at 24.
176. WORKS, supra note 1, at 266 (punctuation modernized for clarity); cf FLIEGELMAN,
supra note 51, at 74 (on "the belief that there is a larger perspective (a greater good) that
comprehends the interests of all parties").
177. WORKS, supra note 1, at 73.
The knowledge of those rational principles on which law is founded ought
especially in a free government, to be diffused over the whole community. In a
free country every citizen forms a part of the sovereign power: he possesses a
vote, or takes a still more active part in the business of the commonwealth. The
right and the duty of giving that vote, the right and the duty of taking that share,
are necessarily attended with the duty of making that business the object of his
study and inquiry.
Id. (punctuation modernized for clarity).
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CONCLUSION
In this essay I have by no means intended to reduce Wilson's constitutional
theory entirely to his social theory. I do endorse, and hope I have contributed
something to, Samuel Beer's interpretation of Wilson's idea of "social union" as
fundamental to Wilson's constitutional theory. 1 8 But in so saying I do not and
need not disagree with J.C.D. Clark's emphasis on Wilson's express belief that
"[n]ot until the Constitution of 1787 did the inhabitants of the thirteen states find
a master symbol which rallied a national consciousness and encouraged the
ascription of their culture to a prior Americanism.' 79
And here I have hardly meant to reduce the problematics of Wilson's
republicanism to what he had to say about female social citizenship and its
function in what I have called the rhetorical constitution of civil society. I have
argued at length in the past, and still believe, that it is impossible to understand
not only Wilson's legal but also his constitutional theory without important
reference, among other things, to the authority he accorded to the institution of
Anglo-American common law, an institution he elaborately portrayed as yet
another "fund" of "social wisdom" quite as necessary to American republicanism
as was any other.'8° But as much store as Wilson put in "the constitutionalism of
the common-law mind,"'' there is no gainsaying that Wilson was a true believer
in "the constitutive function of language," to use a phrase much in fashion in
academic circles for some time now. In the lecture Of Man, as a Member of
Society, Wilson, reflecting both the tendency of early American political culture
and the teachings of Thomas Reid,' unambiguously linked rhetoric with reality
and improvement in language with the improvement of society:
The attention paid to language is one distinguishing mark of the progress of
society towards its most refined period: as society improves, influence is
acquired by the means of reasoning and discourse: in proportion as that
influence is felt to increase, in proportion will be the care bestowed upon the
methods of expressing conceptions with propriety and elegance. In every
178. SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
341-77 (1993).
179. J.C.D. CLARK, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY, 1660-1832: POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND
SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WORLD 60 (1994) (emphasis added); cf I JAMES
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 21 n. I (Chicago, Charles H. Sergel & Co. 1891)
(quoting James Wilson); John M. Murrin, A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma ofAmerican
Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra note 6, at 333.
180. Conrad, supra note 129, at 214.
181. Stephen A. Conrad, The Constitutionalism of "the Common-Law Mind", 13 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 619 (1988).
182. See generally JOHN ZVESPER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS (1977); cf Lewis, supra note 17, at 368 (relating her
use of the concept of "imagined communities" in interpreting the thought of both Madison and
Wilson). On Reid, see Schreyer, supra note 33, at 155 and STEPHEN K. LAND, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE IN BRITAIN: MAJOR THEORIES FROM HOBBES TO THOMAS REID 215-35 (1986).
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polished community, this study has been considered as highly important
183
Because Wilson placed so much emphasis on the social and civic significance
of language, and because he agreed with the widely held view that law was a
necessary constituent element not only of any just civil government but also of
any "civil society," his categorical dissociation from legal culture of the "fair
sex," characteristically disposed to eloquence and wisdom, presents an evident
problem, even an apparent contradiction. I have taken note of the extent to which
Wilson tried to address the problem-or resolve the contradiction-in his
inaugural lecture, with a theory of conservation of female virtue and wisdom and
eloquence by means of a salutary exclusion of women, to leave them not so much
innocent of but undistracted by the materia of legal culture. Yet I think Wilson's
attempt to explain and justify this exclusion is not only unsuccessful as a
resolution of the apparent contradiction between the roles of social and political
citizenship. More importantly, it shows Wilson yet again as a founder who,
although painstakingly erudite and painfully ambitious as a theorist, at times does
much more to reveal the problems of early American republicanism than to
resolve them.'84
Wilson's law lectures, taken as a whole, and I trust, even as selectively quoted
and otherwise represented in this essay, exemplify the problem of many late
eighteenth-century Americans' anxious ambivalence about the nature and
legitimacy of law. Gordon Wood remarks, in a section entitled "The Ambiguity
of American Law,"'85 in his indispensable book on the development of American
constitutionalism in the early Republic:
It began to seem to some [in America] that Americans could not have specific
legislative enactment and equity at the same time, or, contrary to the
Beccarian belief, that codification and simplification of the law demanded an
increase, not a lessening, of judicial interpretation. . . At the heart of the
problem lay Americans' ambivalent attitude toward law in confrontation with
the new circumstances of the 1780's.... Morality was the basis of a republic.
• ..What was needed in fact was a revolutionary clarification in the
Americans' understanding of law and politics.'86
And Wood singles out Wilson for Wilson's recognition of the problem and the
"need" in question.'87
At the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and in his law lectures, Wilson did
articulate with a distinctive candor and clarity the need to understand law as
taking its legitimacy from three sources, all of which were necessary and
interrelated, but none of which was sufficient unto itself-that is: politics,
morality, and consent.
It was this last element "consent" that Wilson most often expressly emphasized
as both the touchstone of legitimate law and the core idea of popular sovereignty
183. WORKS, supra note I, at 231.
184. Cf HAAKONSSEN, supra note 38, at 337 n.67 (discussing Wilson's "tortuous but
remarkable discussion of self-imposed obligation").
185. WOOD, supra note 6, at 291-305.
186. Id. at 303, 305.
187. Id. at 304-05.
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in a true republic. 88 But Wilson's operative conception of "consent," like
Locke's,'89 was so egregiously complex as to be ambiguous at best, if not
irreconcilably self-contradictory. His discussion of "consent" in his lecture Of
Man, as a Member of Society is an especially telling case in point. For there he
says repeatedly that membership in "civil society" entails "voluntary," indeed
volitional, active, individual consent:
The only rational and-natural method.., of constituting a civil society is by
the convention or consent of the members who compose it. For by a civil
society we properly understand the voluntary union of persons in the same
end .... This union is a benefit, not a sacrifice: civil is in addition to natural
order .... In the social compact, each individual engages with the whole
collectively, and the whole collectively engage with each individual. These
engagements are obligatory because they are mutual. The individuals who are
not parties to them are not members of the society.9 '
But membership in civil society-what in this essay I have called "social
citizenship"--is evidently for Wilson analytically quite distinct from what he
himself calls (political?) "citizenship." In his inaugural lecture Wilson said
plainly that "[i]n every free country, every citizen ... possesses a vote""-a
political right possessed by women nowhere in the early American republic
(except.briefly in New Jersey'92). And he hastened to clarify, and attempted to
explain, that in his civic vision "the fair sex" was properly to "have no share in
the formation... of law and government."'93
Yet in his lecture Of Man, as a Member of Society, Wilson ultimately revealed
that his evident distinction between social and political citizenship was not a
distinction he wanted to maintain. Nor could he have maintained it, I would add,
unless he had been willing to depart from the prevailing American
attitude-which even he could not fully articulate in a coherent and
comprehensive theory-that considered politics, morality, and consent as
necessarily inseparable sources of legitimation for law and government. For
example, in this lecture in question, which I have taken throughout this essay as
Wilson's principal set piece on the topic of "civil society," Wilson went farther
than he ever did elsewhere towards expounding a conception of "volitional
citizenship," based on active and immediate consent, that James Kettner has
188. See, e.g., WORKS, supra note 1, at 187 ("Consent is the sole principle on which any
claim, in consequence of human authority, can be made upon one man by another.")
(punctuation modernized for clarity); cf Dennison, supra note 10, at 180 ("This idea of consent
was the kernel of the concept of popular sovereignty, a concept Wilson called the 'panacea in
politics."') (citation omitted).
189. See Julian H. Franklin, Allegiance and Jurisdiction in Locke's Doctrine of Tacit
Consent, 24 POL. THEORY 407 (1996).
190. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239 (emphasis added) (punctuation and paragraph structure
modernized for clarity).
191. Id. at 73.
192. See Judith A. Klinghoffer & Lois Elkis, "The Petticoat Electors": Women's Suffrage
in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159 (1992).
193. WORKS, supra note 41, at 88.
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shown us was eventually to become the prevailing conception of American
citizenship in the new nation.'94
But even in this lecture Wilson equivocates, by alluding to an alternative
conception of "consent"-a conception neither "immediate," nor "active," nor
strictly "volitional," nor even individual. He says in a key passage, which
"comprehends" in general terms but does not here explain the complex theory of
consent that emerges in his law lectures overall, "In a free state [that is, a free
society], the consent of every citizen to its [the society's] institution and
government ought to be evinced either by express declarations or by the
strongest and justest presumptions."' 195
Here Wilson at last leaves no doubt that for him membership in society is a
conception of "citizenship," social citizenship. While this social citizenship
entails "consent," that consent need not be express at all-as long as it is
otherwise evinced by the "strongest" and "justest" presumptions. Here Wilson
is using the eighteenth-century vocabulary of empirical evidence; and, indeed,
for Wilson the very best empirical evidence of consent is not an express
declaration of will at all. As he had said in an earlier lecture:
Of all yet suggested, the mode for the promulgation of human laws by custom
seems the most significant, and the most effectual. It involves in it internal
evidence, of the strongest kind, that the law has been introduced by common
[group, social, rather than individual] consent; and that this consent rests
upon the most solid basis-experience as well as opinion. 96
Throughout the law lectures Wilson repeats his preference for this conservative
conception of consent manifested in "custom"-social customs of the
undifferentiated society at large.'97 As I have noted in passing, above,'98 and at
length elsewhere,'99 Wilson tended to associate this social phenomenon of
custom with the institution of the common law. But legal institutionalization was
hardly essential to Wilson's basic conception of the superior authority of custom
as the corporate agency that most effectively and legitimately forms and governs
a society.
After all, as Gordon Wood has recently reminded us, it was not until "the
Revolution of 1800" (when the Jeffersonian Republicans swept the Federalist
"party" from power) that "the age-old unity between social authority and political
194. See James H. Kettner, The Development ofAmerican Citizenship in the Revolutionary
Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208, 242 (1974) ("By the
beginning of the nineteenth century, then, Americans had only begun to discover the
complexity of the question, 'Who are the People?"'); cf JAMES H. KErrNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 247, passim (1978).
195. WORKS, supra note 1, at 246 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity).
On the "place" Wilson found "for women in the social compact," and for their "important
role," in his view, "in constituting society," see Lewis, supra note 17, at 373, 375-76, passim.
196. WORKS, supra note 1, at 102 (emphasis in original) (punctuation modernized for
clarity).
197. E.g., id. at 122, 123, 184, 190.
198. See supra text accompanying note 180.
199. See generally Conrad, supra note 129.
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authority was broken." ' 0 And as to the distinctive historical "moment" of
Wilson's law lectures, Wood warns against simple or determinate interpretations:
"The decade of the 1790s-the decade of Federalist dominance-is the most
awkward in American history, a decade seemingly unrelated to what preceded or
followed it, a fleeting moment of heroic patriarchal dreams .... ,2oI
Even if Wood somewhat overstates the exceptional awkwardness of the 1790s,
his general point is well taken and quite in accord with what I have tried to add
here to Adam Seligman's and Marvin Becker's remarks about the
"paradigmatic," even "privileged," character of the end of the eighteenth century
in America, as one "moment" in the long and continuing history of the idea of
"civil society."
At such an "awkward," unsettled, not to mention contentious, moment in the
era of Revolutionary settlement of liberal republicanism in America, Wilson in
his law lectures was hardly in a position-and had never been inclined-to lay
the foundation of American law and government exclusively in constitutive acts
of will or even of political process. Thus, for example, even though he begins to
develop his conception of (male, political) citizenship as derived from
immediate, active, and freely given and "discretionary" consent, he does not end
there. Ultimately for Wilson, citizenship (notwithstanding, for example, the
contingent "right of emigration" at will that citizenship entails under any truly
free government) is not only an achievement of individual, political will, it is,
while very much a matter of "rights," just as much a matter of "gratitude" and
"debt" to "the state" for its protection and benefits. 202 Thus Wilson ultimately,
characteristically, and necessarily "interweaves," to use Seligman's word, his
jural conception of "citizenship" with an affective conception of membership in
civil society ("the state"). Without this rhetorical interweaving of political and
social citizenship, the former would prove wanting in the natural, moral
dimension that is necessary in a republic to fully legitimate it. Or, at the least,
Wilson leaves us with his apparent conclusion that political citizenship and
social citizenship are necessary complements of one another.
This same conclusion about the necessary, complementary nature of political
and social citizenship-and, indeed, the primacy of the latter-is twice suggested
in Professor Greene's "Comment." And Greene's remarks call to mind, even
though they do not fully correspond with, what I take to be the single most
important recurring argument of Wilson's lecture Of Man, as a Member of
Society: that the greatest good-the greatest quantum of human happiness-is to
be realized not in the "domestick sphere" and not in even the noblest endeavors
200. Gordon S. Wood, The Would-Be Gentleman, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, August 8, 1996, at 36,
38 (reviewing ALAN TAYLOR, WILLIAM COOPER'S TOWN: POWER AND PERSUASION ON THE
FRONTIER OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC).
201. Id at 37. Compare generally the magisterial volume that I have reason to surmise was
very much in Professor Wood's mind when he wrote the sentence quoted, STANLEY ELKINS &
ERIC McKrrRIc, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993).
202. WORKS, supra note 1, at 243, 245.
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in politics and government, but rather in the innumerable and expansible
"associations" (as both Wilson and Greene call them2 a) of "civil society."2"4
At one point Professor Greene says of the "societies" created over time by the
settlers in colonial British America that "one observer after another"
characterized those societies as having been created "by a concentration on
agriculture; economic prosperity; well-regulated families; concentric circles of
neighborhoods, associations, and institutions that fostered social hospitality,
industry, activity, and a powerful impulse towards improvement.... " 205 Shortly
thereafter, Greene avers, again from the perspective of the social historian, that
for colonial British Americans, among "the ends of civil society," of special
importance was "the great end of facilitating the pursuit of happiness by
individuals who composed that society; and that, that pursuit would be, for most
people, conducted far more satisfyingly in the society of the family,
neighborhood, or local civic institutions than in the small political arena that
characterized the colonies."2 6
At least by the time Wilson composed his law lectures, if not, indeed, by the
time he helped pen the essays of The Visitant, °7 Wilson's vision of "civil
society" would seem to have focused on the universal, pervasive nature of
"sociability"-and on its tendency to embrace ever expanding spheres of
realization. Wilson, in exalting "society" over "publick affairs," had said in his
inaugural lecture that he meant "particularly domestick society."20 8 Indeed,
Wilson made such an important place for what Professor Greene calls "well-
regulated families" that Wilson at one point in his lectures posited the very
"origin" of all "society" in "the institution of marriage"; yet, again he invoked
Cicero as authority. 9 But Wilson's forward-looking vision of "civil society"
emphasized not the superseded matters of origins but the promising intrinsic
principles of society, above all the "improvement," the "progress," and
"enlarge[d] . . . sphere of pleasure and enjoyment" that those principles
promised." ° For "sociability... insinuates herself into the hearts of every rank
and class of men, and mixes in all the various modes and arrangements of life."'21'
Thus Wilson concluded that within the sphere of:
203. Id. at 235.
204. Contrast the well-considered interpretation of Wilson in RAHE, supra note 163, at 565,
568, 1046 n.84, and in the index entry at 1200, s.v. Wilson, James ("Wilson... denies primacy
to politics... exalts politics nonetheless.").
205. Greene, supra note 8, at 379 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 380.
207. See those passages in the essays of "The Visitant" in which felicity is closely associated
with expansible circles of "conversation": The Visitant [No. I], supra note 28; The Visitant
[No. 2], supra note 51; and The Visitant [No. 4], supra note 54. See especially, for the general
proposition regarding material and immaterial "wants and desires," that "we are perfect in
proportion as our pleasures are multiplied," found in The Visitant [No. 5], 2 PA. CHRoN., Feb.
22-29, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
208. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
209. WORKS, supra note 1, at 598.
210. Id. at 236 and 235, in the order cited.
211. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
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a single family ... [no doubt] some room will be afforded for social
enjoyments, and for the finer operations of the mind. Still greater pleasures
and advantages would be obtained by the union of a few families in the same
neighborhood. They would undertake and execute laborious works for the
common good of all; and social emotions would operate in a less contracted
circuit. Associations still larger will enlarge the sphere of pleasure and
enjoyment, and will furnish more diversified and delightful exercise to our
powers of every kind.212
This is a vision of maximizing felicity in civil society that puts little more
premium on the "domestick sphere" than it does on "politicks," and that is a
vision not so much of the pursuit of individual happiness as of the "reciprocal"2 3
experience of happiness as a function of enlarged social life. It is a vision of
happiness more social than it is either private or "publick"; more "republican,"
perhaps, than "liberal"; more a professor's adduced ideal than an emergent
nation's reality; and, accordingly, more a vision of the powerful, albeit briefly
powerful, capability of rhetoric than of the capability of human behaviors too
otherwise absorbed to be guided by theory.
If considered in this light, Wilson's general concept of "civil
society"-positing its origins and its destined progress in individual human
nature and the naturalness of social relations-and his occasional, derivative
conceptions of "civil society"--such as the Visitant's idealization of polite
society and the law professor's hypostatization of a neo-Ciceronian rhetorical
constitution of "civil society"-all can take on meaning as symptoms. They can
seem to be symptoms of the ordeal of one of the most prominent lawyers and
most ambitious-although ultimately unsuccessful2 4 theorists among the
founders in the enterprise of trying to understand and explain the meaning of law
and government in a new, indeed, still nascent liberal republican society. To the
historian of ideas-of early American law, government, or civil
society-Wilson's anxious ordeal and his failure in this definitive enterprise of
the late eighteenth-century "Founding" are interesting matters in and of
themselves. Yet even to engaged theorists today whose concerns lie with what
they take to be the persistent, inherent problem of "the ambiguity, and the
choices, behind all rule systems"2 ' in law, politics, and government, Wilson's
example might also be interesting, as a case study drawn from the "moment"
when the problem was just coming to be recognized but not yet fully
acknowledged in America.
212. Id. at 235 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
213. Id.
214. See, in agreement, HAAKONSSEN, supra note 38, at 340-41; cf Conrad, supra note 3,
at 64-70.
215. Kathleen B. Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women Are Not Entitled to Speak, in
NOMOS XXIX: AUTHORITY REvIsrrED 152, 165-66 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1987).
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